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Strawson's Argument against the Cartesian  Thesis  : 
            An Interpretation
                             Robert L. Latta 
 In Chapter 3 of his book Individuals, the much-discussed chapter  "  Persons," P. F. 
Strawson puts forward an argument which he summarizes in these  words      
. . . One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them 
   to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of 
   experience. And one cannot identify others if one can identify them only as subjects 
   of experience,  possessors of states of consciousness.' 
This is one of the central arguments in  "  Persons." I shall refer to it as Strawson's 
argument against the Cartesian thesis—with apologies to Descartes if I misapply his 
name. By  '  the Cartesian thesis,' I mean the thesis that the experiences of a human 
being pertain to an entity to which nothing but experiences pertain, and his or her 
physical attributes to a numerically distinct, i.e., a second, entity. What I call the Carte-
sian thesis does not, of course, constitute a full Cartesian theory of mind and body, for 
that would include, among other things, an account of the relations between a human 
being's mind, a subject of experience, and his or her body, a subject of physical attributes. 
The Cartesian thesis does, however, constitute the core of any Cartesian theory of mind 
and body, and it is this core thesis that Strawson attacks. 
 Though it is not typical of his writing, in Individuals, Strawson leaves himself open 
to indefinitely many widely diverging interpretations. At certain critical points, all the 
reader has to go on are short remarks that resemble nothing so much as notes of the 
sort that one makes for one's own use alone. Not surprisingly, Strawson's critics have 
interpreted the argument I have quoted in various ways. Many believe themselves to 
have refuted that argument. What they have in fact refuted, however, is a remarkably 
diverse group of arguments as numerous as the critics themselves, arguments which for 
the most part, if the truth be told, are quite easy to refute. My thesis is  this  : Strawson's 
argument against the Cartesian thesis can be given an interpretation faithful to the text 
under which it is formidable and, if sound, philosphically significant, and under which 
the great majority if not all of the criticisms that appear in the published literature simply 
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do not apply. I shall defend this thesis by presenting an interpretation of my own. I 
shall appeal to Strawson's wording to show that my interpretation is accurate with respect 
to those points on which he is explicit. I shall cite a few of his critics, but only inci-
dentally, in order to explain my own readings of certain passages more clearly. 
 The paper is divided into several sections. The first contains remarks on the meanings 
of certain key terms. In the second, I present and defend my interpretation of Strawson's 
argument against the Cartesian thesis, and in the third, I discuss the implications of that 
argument for that thesis. In the fourth section, I take up Strawson's thesis that  "  the 
concept of a  person  " is  "  logically primitive," for his argument against the Cartesian 
thesis constitutes his defense of the more problematical clause of that thesis. In the fifth 
section, I present and reply to several objections that have occurred to me at various 
times. The sixth and final section contains a brief summary. 
1. Remarks on Terminology 
 Below, I make remarks on certain key terms. These remarks are meant to clarify, but 
they are not in every case offered as full definitions. 
  (1) When Strawson uses the term  '  ascribe  ' with  experiences,' or  '  a pain,' or  '  feel-
ings' or the like as direct object, he means  '  to assert to belong or pertain,' and not  '  to 
assign to a cause.' In this application, I shall use this term in the same sense. 
  (2) Strawson uses the expression  '  a  particular' to mean a particular thing, event, 
state, place, or time, etc., where particulars stand in contrast with various sorts of non-
particulars, like universals, species, numbers, attributes, etc.2 I shall adopt the expression 
 a  particular' and shall use it in this way. It must be admitted that this expression is 
in a way  problematical  : it is problematical in that it is not possible to give an accurate 
and full explication of its meaning without first solving the large and fundamental problem 
of the particular/general dichotomy. But this much at least is, I think,  clear  : leaving 
out of account the problematical case of particular times and places, if an individual, 
X, is to be considered a particular, then it must be possible in principle that there are 
individuals numerically distinct from X but exactly like it. This condition is met, foi 
example, by the pen which I am holding, and by tokens of the numeral  '  3,' but not by 
sobriety, or by the number three. 
  (3) Strawson applies theexpression  '  identification of  particulars' to several different 
operations. He applies it, first, to the process of establishing references to particulars 
in speech, i.e., in interpersonal discourse. In this first application, if a speaker attempts to 
establish a reference to a particular and his hearer understands that reference, i.e., knows 
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what particular the speaker is referring to, then the hearer, and hence the speaker, are 
said to have identified the particular in question. A hearer, then, identifies a particular 
in the sense that he understands a speaker's reference to it, whereas a speaker identifies 
one in the sense that he makes such a reference to it that his hearer understands that 
 reference.3 At a later point, Strawson applies this expression to a somewhat different 
 operation  : the process of establishing references to particulars  "  in thought," i.e., in the 
sort of intrapersonal discourse that is characteristic of solitary thought. I shall use the 
expression  '  identification of  particulars' myself in the senses defined by Strawson, al-
though the expression  '  establishment of references to  particulars' would, I believe, do 
just as well. 
  There is an alternative interpretation of Strawson's use of the term  '  identify' that 
I wish to mention. It appears that according to Donald Sievert, in Strawson's usage,  
'  identify' means  ' locate in space and time.'  4 This, I think, is a serious misunderstanding. 
In explaining what meaning he gives to the term  '  identify,' Strawson makes no reference 
to space and time. Reference to spatial-temporal location occurs only in his treatment 
of the question of the ways in which references to particulars can be established. Defining 
the term  `identify,' and taking up this question, are two entirely distinct things. One 
must do the former before one can do the latter. 
  (4) By  '  a subject of experience,' or for short  '  a subject,' I mean simply an entity 
to which experiences can with truth be ascribed. The question in what sense or way 
experiences are ascribable to the entities which are said to have them has a central place 
in Strawson's case against empiricist accounts of the idea of a subject of experience, 
but is not closely connected with his argument against the Cartesian thesis. I shall 
therefore avoid this question in this paper in order not to obscure the issues at hand. 
  (5) By  '  a subject of physical attritutes,' I take Strawson to mean, and shall mean 
myself, simply an entity to which physical attributes can with truth be ascribed. Thus, 
a stone, a tree, and the dead body of Jones all count as subjects of physical attributes. 
Since the term  '  subject  ' is not often used in this connection, confusion can arise. For 
example, R. L. Phillips states that Cartesian dualism, as described by Strawson,  
.  .  . regards a person as a compound of  '  two subjects of  experience  ', a mind and 
    a  body..  .  .5 
Strawson means, however, not two subjects of experience, but a subject of experience 
and a subject of physical attributes. 
  (6) By  '  a pure subjectof experience,' I mean an entity to which experiences and 
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nothing but experiences can be ascribed. Strawson sometimes uses the term  '  a pure 
individual  consciousness' to refer to entities of this type. 
 (7) In order to explain more clearly what Strawson means by  '  the concept of a person,' 
I shall first explain what he means by  '  a logical type.' He does not define this latter 
term, but the following definition of it appears accurately to reflect his  usage  : a logical 
type is a type defined as the type to which predicate-expressions of a certain class or 
classes are significantly applicable. Not all types of particulars are logical types. Consider 
this definition of the term  pulley  '  :      
. . . a sheave with the pin on which it turns, the frame in which it runs, and the 
   flexible rope, cord, or chain passing through the groove that is used singly to change 
   the direction and point of application of a pulling force applied at one end of the 
   rope, cord, or chain and singly or in any of various definite combinations to increase 
   the applied force esp. for lifting  weights  .  .  .6 
To define the term  '  pulley  ' thus is not to define the type of particulars in question in 
the way just described. Pulleys constitute a type, but, at least by the definition above, 
not a logical type. 
 In order to understand Strawson's argumentation, it is essential to realize that he uses 
the term  '  the concept of a  person  ' in a special, technical  way  : 
     . . . What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity 
   such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing 
   corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single 
   individual of that single  type..  .  .7 
By this definition, persons constitute a logical type. Rocks, for example, are not of this 
particular logical type, since experiences are not ascribable to rocks. Pure subjects of 
experience are not of this type because physical attributes are not ascribable to them. 
But if the reasoning that I shall attribute to Strawson is sound, then Strawson  himself 
while he lives and breathes, Descartes while he lived and breathed, and my neighbor's 
pet canary while it lives and breathes, count as persons by Strawson's definition, for if the 
reasoning in question is sound, then as long as these three entities function biologically 
in normal ways, they are to be conceived as subjects of both experiences and physical 
attributes. 
 It should be noted that Strawson's definition of the concept of a person is a stipulation, 
not a lexical definition. Thus, although, evidently, he intends that his definition accord 
with common usage to the extent that if his reasoning concerning the concept of a subject 
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of experience is sound, then any person in the most usual sense counts as a person by 
it, he does not put it forward as a description or analysis of common usage. His use 
of the term  '  a  person  ' has  brought about  confusion  ; he might have done better to use 
a term like  '  a subject of both experiences and physical  attributes' instead, for this is 
exactly what he means by  '  a person.' In this paper, I shall use the term  '  a  person  ' 
in the sense Strawson defines, but with caution. 
 (8) By  '  a disembodied person,' Strawson means a subject of experience that once had 
physical attributes but has lost them. To put it another way, a disembodied person is 
a pure subject of experience which in an earlier stage of its existence was a  "  person " 
in the technical sense, but then lost its physical aspect. He also uses the term  "  former 
 person  " to refer to such an entity. 
 (9) By  '  a Cartesian ego,' I mean an entity which is a pure subject of experience 
throughout the duration of its existence. The types  '  Cartesian  ego' and  '  disembodied 
person,' then, are mutually exclusive, though both a Cartesian ego and a disembodied 
person are to be understood to be pure subjects of experience. 
2. Strawson's Argument 
 The first premiss of Strawson's argument against the Cartesian thesis reads as  follows  :      
. . . It is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, 
   to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared 
   to ascribe them, to others who are not  oneself..  .  .8 
When he comes to summarize his argument, he states this premiss more  simply  :      
. . . One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them 
   to others.9 
 Strawson comments on and defends this premiss of his argument in a very compact 
and difficult three-paragraph footnote. In the first paragraph, he brings an  objection  :      
. . . I can imagine an objection to the unqualified form of this statement, an objection 
   which might be put as follows. Surely the idea of a uniquely applicable predicate, 
   i.e. a predicate which belongs to only one individual, is not absurd. And, if it is 
   not, then surely the most that can be claimed is that a necessary condition of one's 
   ascribing predicates of a certain class to one individual, i.e. oneself, is that one should 
   be prepared, or ready, on appropriate occasions, to ascribe them to other individuals, 
   and hence that one should have a conception of what those appropriate occasions 
   for ascribing them would  be  ; but not, necessarily, that one should actually do so 
   on any  occasion." 
Clearly, the  "  unqualified  form  " of the premiss under consideration is the form obtained 
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by deleting the qualifying phrase  '  or be prepared to ascribe  them  ' :  '  It is a necessary 
condition of one's ascribing experiences to oneself, in the way one does, that one should 
also ascribe them to others.' The objection that Strawson brings against the unqualified 
form of the first premiss of his argument, then, is this. The idea of a predicate-expression 
that applies truly to only one individual is perfectly intelligible. Hence, it is conceivable 
that those predicate-expressions that are used to ascribe experiences should be truly 
applicable to  only one individual. But clearly, it  is conceivable that that individual, 
who would of course be the only subject of experience in the universe, should apply 
those predicate-expressions to himself but not to any other individual. He might often 
say, for example,  "  I feel lonely," but never  "  It feels lonely." Hence, it cannot be said 
that a subject of experience can ascribe experiences to himself only if on occasion he 
actually ascribes experiences to others. Therefore the premiss under consideration, in 
its unqualified  form, is false. 
 Strawson allows this objection to stand. He maintains only the weak version of the 
first premiss of his argument, the version according to which, to be in a position to 
ascribe experiences to oneself, one need not actually ascribe them to others, but need 
only  "  be  prepared  " to do so  "  on appropriate  occasions  " (see the last quotation above). 
As I read him, his phrase  be prepared to ascribe experiences to others on appropriate 
 occasions' means  know under what conditions it is correct to apply the relevant predicate 
expressions to others.' His defense of this assertion  is to be found in the third paragraph 
of his  footnote  :
    The  mainpoint here is a purely logical  one  : the idea of a predicate is correlative 
   with that of a range of distinguishable individuals  of which the predicate can be 
   significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed.11 
By  "  main point," he means  underlying point.' He takes the position that the proposition 
in question entails the first premiss of his argument. This proposition appears to be 
nothing more than the commonplace that an expression like  . is angry,'  or  . is tall,' 
or  . is made of  rosewood' can be applied to any number of individuals. To put this 
more  accurately  : it is an essential characteristic of predicate-expressions  that, in any one 
of its meanings, any given predicate-expression can in principle be applied significantly 
 to' any number of individuals of certain types. Thus, to illustrate, the meaning of the 
predicate-expression is  angry' is such that in principle, it can be applied significantly 
to any number of  people, chimpanzees, dogs, etc. Moreover, in a different sense, doubtless 
 a derivative one, it can in principle be applied significantly to any number of rivers or 
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storms. 
 Strawson leaves it to his reader to work out the connection between his point about the 
logic of predicate-expressions and the first premiss of his argument against the Cartesian 
thesis. Note that the former is more general than the latter. His point about predicate-
expressions has to do with predicate-expressions in general, whereas the first premiss of 
his argument has to do only with predicate-expressions of a certain  class  : those that are 
used to ascribe experiences. I shall now assume the former and derive the latter from 
it. The first explicit step in the derivation is to assume the negation of the consequent 
of the conditional to be  derived  : Assume that one cannot ascribe experiences to others 
in that one does not know under what conditions it is correct to apply the relevant 
predicate-expressions to others. Then from one's own point of view, as a matter of 
principle, expressions that are used to ascribe experiences can be applied significantly 
to only one individual—viz., oneself. But it is an essential  characteristic of predicate-
expressions that any given one can in principle be applied significantly to any number 
of individuals. Consequently, in the case in question, expressions that are used to ascribe 
experiences cannot function as predicate-expressions. But this is to say that they cannot 
be used to ascribe experiences, which in turn is to say that there are no expressions 
that can be used for this purpose. But if this is so, then, obviously, one cannot ascribe 
experiences to oneself, in that one does not have the requisite predicate-expressions at 
one's command for use in specch and thought. Therefore, to convert to the contrapositive, 
if one can ascribe experiences to oneself in that one has the requisite predicate-expressions 
at one's command for use in speech and thought, then one can ascribe experiences to 
others also, in that one knows under what conditions it is correct to apply those predicate-
expressions to others. 
 This derived proposition represents my interpretation of the first premiss of Strawson's 
argument against the Cartesian thesis. It is, if true, an inobvious truth that carries 
considerable philosophical significance. I shall now make a short digression to describe 
one way in which it is significant. Many philosophers have pointed out a peculiar fact 
about predicate-expressions like, for  example  :  . (suffer / suffers) a twinge of regret,'  
. (feel / feels) dizzy,' etc. In one special case, the case in which one affirms  '  / am 
suffering a twinge of  regret' or  / feel dizzy,' etc., one can affirm of a person, viz., 
oneself, that he or she is having an experience of such and such a sort without having 
to appeal to behavioral criteria, and without having to ask another person, to determine 
whether one's affirmation is justified. To put this more concisely, the criteria for the 
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ascription of experiences play no part in the process of self-ascription of experiences. 
This fact might quite naturally give rise to the following  impression  : it is conceivable 
that a subject should ascribe experiences to himself, and yet have no conception of 
criteria for ascribing them, i.e., to others. But if the proposition which figures as the first 
premiss of Strawson's argument against the Cartesian thesis is true, then this impression is 
mistaken, for if that proposition is true, then, if a subject had no conception of criteria for 
ascribing experiences to others, he would have at his command no linguistic expressions 
to use to ascribe experiences to any subject, even himself. 
 In the critical literature, the first premiss of Strawson's argument is given many different 
interpretations. There is one in particular that I wish to mention, for it is very popular, 
and I want to distinguish it sharply from my own. According to this interpretation, the 
premiss in question can be put as  follows  : 
   One can ascribe experiences to an entity that one conceives of as oneself only if 
   one can ascribe experiences to entities that one conceives of as  others." 
Under my interpretation, the premiss in question is fundamentally different from this, 
and can be put this  way  : 
   One can ascribe experiences to a certain entity—viz., the one which in fact one 
   conceives of as oneself, only if one can ascribe experiences to other entities in that 
   one knows under what conditions it is correct to ascribe an experience of this or 
   that sort to another. 
The latter proposition, given that the condition stated in its consequent is not met, rules 
out even the possibility that one should ascribe experiences to a certain entity, viz., 
oneself, while failing to conceive of that entity as oneself. But the former proposition, 
given that the condition stated in its consequent is not met, does not rule out this possi-
bility. In this way, then, the latter proposition expresses a more sweeping thesis than 
the former. But the consequence to be drawn from Strawson's point about the logic of 
predicate-expressions i this latter, more sweeping thesis. 
 The second premiss of Strawson's argument reads as  follows  :      
. . . One can ascribe [states of consciousness] to others only if one can identify 
   other subjects of  experience." 
This might be taken to  mean  : as a practical matter, if one cannot establish references 
to others, then one cannot ascribe experiences to them. Quite clearly, this premiss so 
interpreted is true, for so interpreted, if follows from this general  principle  : ascribing 
a characteristic or a state to a particular essentially involves referring to that particular. 
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Thus, for example, ascribing the characteristic of being red to the barn involves referring 
to the barn—by means of an expression like  `the barn,'  for example, or perhaps by 
means of a demonstrative like  '  that  ' coupled with a gesture. 
 I think, however, that the thesis Strawson has in mind is a somewhat more subtle one. 
The second premiss of his argument should of course dovetail with the first and third pre-
need misses. The first premiss, as I have explained it, is  this  : If A (a proposition there 
is no to repeat here), then  B: one can ascribe experiences to others in that one knows 
under what conditions it is correct to apply the relevant predicate-expressions to others. 
I shall take the antecedent of the second premiss to be this proposition B. But the third 
premiss, as I interpret it, is  this  : If D (a proposition I shall introduce later), then  not-C: 
one cannot identify others at all, in that no coherent account of how to go about identi-
fying them can possibly be formulated. I shall take the consequent of the second premiss 
to be proposition C, since the negation of the consequent of the second premiss is the 
consequent of the third  premiss  : see Strawson's summary of his argument, quoted on 
page 1 above. As I interpret it, then, the second premiss of Strawson's argument is  this  :
if one can ascribe experiences to others in that one knows under what conditions it is 
correct to apply the relevant predicate-expressions to them, then one can identify others 
in that a coherent account of how to go about identifying them can be formulated. 
  As far as I can see, Strawson does not indicate how this premiss might be defended. 
The case for it, however, can, I think, be stated rather  simply  : To say that no coherent 
account of how to go about identifying subjects of experience numerically distinct from 
oneself can possibly be formulated is to say that no question at all arises of identifying 
others. But if no question at all arises of identifying others, then there is no such thing 
as knowing under what conditions it is correct to ascribe an experience of this or that 
sort to another subject. From this it follows that if one does know under what conditions 
it is correct to ascribe an experience of this or that sort to another subject, then it is 
possible to formulate a coherent account of how to go about identifying others. 
  The third premiss of Strawson's argument against the Cartesian thesis is  this  :  
.  .  . One cannot identify others if one can identify them only as subjects of expe-
    rience, possessors of states of  consciousness." 
I take his meaning to be  this  : if, in identifying subjects of experience numerically distinct 
from oneself, all one has to go on, of all that is ascribable to them, are their experiences, 
then one cannot identify others at all, in that no coherent account of how to go about 
identifying them can possibly be formulated. Or, to put the point more  shortly  : if 
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subjects of experience are Cartesian egos, then one cannot identify subjects numerically 
distinct from oneself. It is possible to piece together an argument for this premiss from 
things Strawson says in various passages. I shall do this now. 
 To begin with, Strawson asserts that any particular that has a spatio-temporal position 
has a unique spatio-temporal position, i.e., one shared by no other  particular.15 But 
clearly, if each Cartesian ego has a unique spatio-temporal position, then, at least in 
theory, there is no problem about how to identify them. Clearly, then, it is Strawson's 
view that Cartesian egos are not to be conceived as having spatio-temporal positions. 
Human bodies do, of course, have spatio-temporal positions, but Strawson maintains further 
that there is no guarantee of a logical or conceptual sort that given a human body, only 
one Cartesian ego is causally associated with it. In order to make this point, he puts a 
rhetorical  question  :      
. . . Can we not identify [a Cartesian  ego]  as  .  .  .  ` the subject of those experiences 
   which stand in the same unique causal relation to body N as my experiences tand 
   in to body  M'  ?  .  .  ,16 
He makes two replies to this question, one of which reads as  follows  :      
. . . What right have we, in this explanation, to speak of the subject, implying 
 uniqueness  ? Why should there not be any number of subjects of experience—perhaps 
   qualitatively indistinguishable—each subject and each set of experiences standing in 
   the same unique relation to body N (or to body M) ? Uniqueness of the body does 
   not guarantee uniqueness of the Cartesian  soul.'' 
His meaning, I take it, is the following. Assume that subjects of experience are Cartesian 
egos. Then it is possible in principle that each of many numerically distinct sets of 
experiences, perhaps of exactly the same description, each had by a numerically distinct 
subject, is causally connected in certain ways with the physical states of a given human 
body B. That is to say, this is a possibility in that nothing about the concept of a 
Cartesian ego rules it out as a possibility. But it follows that there can be no warrant 
for the employment of definite descriptions of the forms  `the set of experiences that is 
causally connected in such and such ways with the physical states of body B' or  `the 
Cartesian ego that has the set of experiences that is causally connected in such and such 
ways with the physical states of body B.' 
 Furthermore, in Chapter 1 of Individuals, Strawson puts forward a complex account 
of the ground of the possibility of identifying particulars. As I read him, his main 
conclusion is the following. People can in fact identify particulars of a vast range and 
 97
              A aki X 
of many different ypes in speech and in thought, and can in principle identify particulars 
of a yet more extensive range and further types. Of these particulars, some but not all 
have spatio-temporal positions. Particulars that have spatio-temporal positions form a 
system of relations within which each such particular has a unique position. This is 
the only system of relations that can serve as the core of a system within which each 
particular, of the very extensive range and many types which people can in principle 
identify, has a unique position. But this wider system of relations, the one within which 
each particular of whatever type has a unique position, is an indispensable instrument 
in the identification of particulars. For the only way to distinguish a given particular 
from absolutely all others is to indicate or allude to some circumstance in virtue of which 
it has a unique position within this system. Thus, to illustrate, if a certain piece of land 
is the only one owned by a certain man, then it has a unique position within the system 
of relations in question in that it has such and such a position in space and time, and 
in addition, in what is perhaps a figurative sense of  ` position,' it has a unique position 
within this system in that it is the only piece of land owned by that man, and he has 
a unique position, or series of positions, within the system. 
 But taken together, these views suggest the following argument. Assume that subjects 
of experience are Cartesian egos. Then they have no positions in space. Moreover, 
given any particular in space, there is no relation such that there is ground for assurance 
in the logic of the matter that that relation obtains between that particular on the one 
hand, and only one subject of a given general description on the other. Hence, subjects 
of experience do not have positions within the general system of relations among par-
ticulars. Hence, one cannot have any conception of how to fit particulars of this type, 
subjects of experience, into this system. Hence, one has no conception of how to go  about 
identifying subjects of experience. Therefore, if subjects of experience are Cartesian 
egos, then one cannot identify others, in that one cannot formulate any sound conception 
of how to go about doing this.—But this is the third premiss of Strawson's argument 
against the Cartesian thesis. 
 Now let us return briefly to Strawson's rhetorical question whether one can identify 
a Cartesian ego numerically distinct from oneself as  "  the subject of those experiences 
which stand in the same unique causal relation to body N as my experiences stand in 
to body M." 18 As I wrote, he makes two replies to this question. I have incorporated 
the second of these replies into the argument stated in the preceding paragraph, but the 
first reply ought to be considered  too, if only because it has been widely misinterpreted. 
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It reads as follows: 
     . . . This suggestion is useless. It requires me to have  noted  . .  . that my experiences 
   stand in a special relation to body  M  ; but it requires me to have noted this as a 
   condition of being able to identify other subjects of experiences, i.e. as a condition 
   of my having the idea of myself as a subject of experience, i.e. as a condition of 
   thinking of any experiences as  mine..  .  .19 
Few of Strawson's critics recognize that in this passage, he appeals to the first and second 
premisses of his argument against the Cartesian thesis to show that the suggestion in 
question, in relying upon the expression  '  my experiences,' presupposes what it purports 
to establish—viz., the possibility of identifying Cartesian egos numerically distinct from 
oneself. His reasoning can be restated as follows. If one is in a  position to identify a 
Cartesian ego numerically distinct from oneself by means of the expression  `the subject 
of those experiences which stand in the same unique causal relation to body N as my 
experiences tand in to body M,' then, of course, one is in a position to ascribe experiences 
to oneself. So, in relying upon this expression, the suggestion in question presupposes 
that one can ascribe experiences to oneself. But by the first premiss of the argument 
against the Cartesian thesis, if one can do this, then one can ascribe experiences to 
Cartesian egos numerically distinct from oneself. But in turn, by the second premiss 
of that argument, if one can do this, then one can identify Cartesian egos numerically 
distinct from oneself. So, in presupposing that one can ascribe experiences to oneself, 
the suggestion in question presupposes that one can identify Cartesian egos numerically 
distinct from oneself. But this, of course, is just what it purports to establish. 
 As I interpret Strawson's argument against the Cartesian thesis, then, its three premisses 
have the  form  :  '  if A then  B,"  if B then  C,'  if D then not-C.' From this, it is possible 
to  derive  :  if D then (not C and (not-B and not-A)).' Substitution yields the following 
proposition, which I shall take to be the conclusion of Strawson's  argument  : If, in iden-
tifying subjects of experience numerically distinct from oneself, all one has to go on, of 
all that is ascribable to them, are their experiences, then it is impossible in principle for 
one to identify other subjects, and impossible in principle for one to ascribe experiences 
to other subjects or to oneself. 
3. Implications for the Cartesian Thesis 
 As I pointed out in the introduction, the core of any Cartesian theory of the relation 
between mind and body is the Cartesian  thesis  : the thesis that the experiences of a human 
being pertain to an entity to which nothing but experiences pertain, and his or her 
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physical attributes to a numerically distinct, i.e., a second, entity. Now if the argument 
that I have presented and attributed to Strawson is sound, it establishes that the Cartesian 
thesis is untenable. But since this might be considered less than obvious, I shall now 
show that it is so. 
 Suppose thatpeople actually do ascribe states, characteristics, properties, etc. to par-
ticular things of a certain type T. Then, clearly, there exist linguistic conventions of two 
 sorts  : (1) conventions for the use of expressions to refer to particulars of type T, and 
(2) conventions for the use of expressions to ascribe states etc. that can be manifested 
by particulars of type T. Let us adopt the following definition. Let concept C be the 
concept of type T of particulars. Thus, concept C might be the concept of a certain 
type of automobiles. Then concept C is incorporated in language if there  exist  conventions 
for the use of expressions to refer to particulars of type T, and conventions for the use 
of expressions to ascribe states etc. that can be manifested by things of type T. To say 
that concept C cannot be incorporated in language, then, is to say that for one reason 
or another, it is not possible to institute conventions of one or the other of these two 
 sorts. 
 Now let us assume for a moment that Strawson's argument against the Cartesian thesis 
is sound, and hence its conclusion true. Although the expression  '  is incorporated in 
 language' does not appear in Strawson's presentation, the conclusion of his argument can 
be put as  follows  :  If we assume that subjects of experience are Cartesian egos, then the 
question how to introduce into discourse predicate-expressions that can be used to ascribe 
experiences to oneself, and in addition, the question how to institute conventions for 
establishing references to others, represent problems that are in principle unsolvable. 
But this is to say that as a matter of principle, the concept of a Cartesian ego cannot 
be incorporated in language.' Now Cartesian theorists, of course, present the concept of 
a Cartesian ego as the concept of a type of particulars that actually exist, or that can 
at least be conceived to exist. But to say that as a matter of principle, the concept of 
a Cartesian ego cannot be incorporated in language is to say that it is impossible in 
principle to formulate any sound conception of how to go about making statements, even 
false ones, about individual Cartesian egos. But if it is impossible in principle to say 
things about individual Cartesian egos, then, to employ a Strawsonian phrase which 
expresses one of Strawson's thoughts, particulars of this type cannot figure in our speech 
and thought about the world, and from this it follows that they cannot be conceived to 
exist. Therefore, if Strawson's argument is sound, the concept of a Cartesian ego is a 
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pseudoconcept in that particulars of the type it represents cannot even be conceived to 
exist. 
 Strawson claims that the Cartesian thesis is  "  incoherent," 20 by which he means that 
it is inconsistent with at least one of its own presuppositions. I shall now explain why 
he makes this claim, and in doing so, I shall show once again that if his argument against 
the Cartesian thesis is sound, then that thesis is indeed untenable. Assume that it is 
impossible to ascribe experiences to oneself in that, for whatever reason, as a matter of 
principle, no predicate-expressions to serve the purpose can be introduced into discourse. 
Assume further that for whatever reason, it is impossible in principle to identify other 
subjects of experience. Then, of course, no question arises of ascribing experiences to 
any subject, either to oneself or to others. But then, of course, the question whether the 
Cartesian thesis is true, that is, the question whether experiences are in the final analysis 
to be ascribed to Cartesian egos or to entities of some other description, simply does not 
arise, which is to say that it cannot legitimately be raised. In this sense, the Cartesian 
thesis carries a  presupposition  : that it is possible in principle to ascribe experiences to 
oneself and to identify other subjects. But if Strawson's argument against the Cartesian 
thesis is sound, then, under the assumption that the Cartesian thesis is true, that is, under 
the assumption that subjects of experience are Cartesian egos, these things are not possi-
ble. Therefore, if Strawson's argument is sound, the Cartesian thesis is inconsistent with 
one of its presuppositions, and hence is untenable. 
  In his article  "  Cartesian Dualism and the Unity of a Mind," Chin-Tai Kim offers an 
interpretation that is similar to mine on the point under  discussion  :
      . . . The incoherence of Cartesian dualism, according to Strawson,  •  . consists in 
   the fact that whereas this theory is supposed to provide, among other things, an 
   explanation of how self-attribution of experiences is possible, its basic thesis that a 
   subject of experiences is a Cartesian mind leads to the stultifying consequence that 
    self-attribution of experiences is impossible.2' 
But Kim errs, I think, at two points. First, Cartesian theories, both as Strawson represents 
them and as most if not all Cartesians represent them, do not purport to explain but 
rather presuppose the possibility of self-ascription of experiences. Secondly, Strawson 
maintains that under the assumption that subjects of experience are Cartesian egos, not 
just self-ascription of experiences, but any ascription of experiences, must be considered 
impossible.
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4. The Thesis of Primitiveness 
  Strawson assertsthat  "  the concept of a person," in the technical sense in which he 
uses this term, is  "  logically primitive." But the question what he means by this claim, 
and the question how the defends it, are matters of much dispute. He explains what he 
means in several passages, the chief of which reads as  follows  :
     [1]  .  .  . We are tempted to think of a person as a sort of compound of two kinds 
   of  subjects  : a subject of experiences (a pure consciousness, an ego) on the one hand, 
   and a subject of corporeal attributes on the  other..  .  . when we ask ourselves how we 
   come to frame, to get a use for, the concept of this compound of two subjects, the 
   picture—if we are honest and careful—is apt to change from the picture of two 
   subjects to the picture of one subject and one non-subject. For it becomes impossible 
   to see how we could come by the idea of different, distinguishable, identifiable 
   subjects of experiences-different consciousnesses-if this idea is thought of as logically 
   primitive, as a logical ingredient in the compound-idea of a person, the latter being 
   composed of two subjects. For there could never be any question of assigning an 
   experience, as such, to any subject other than  oneself  ; and therefore never any 
   question of ascribing it to a subject at all. So the concept of the pure individual 
    consciousness—the pure ego—is a concept that cannot  exist  ; or, at least, cannot exist 
   as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained 
   or analysed. It can exist only, if at all, as a secondary, non-primitive concept, which 
   itself is to be explained, analysed, in terms of the concept of a  person... .22
Farther down the page, he adds : 
 [2] The concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. 
   The concept of a person is not to be analysed as that of an animated body or  of 
   an embodied anima. This is not to say that the concept of a pure individual con-
   sciousness might not have a logically secondary existence, if one thinks, or finds, 
   it desirable. We speak of a dead person—a body—and in the same secondary way 
   we might at least think of a disembodied person. A person is not an embodied 
   ego, but an ego might be a disembodied person, retaining the logical benefit of 
   individuality from having been a person.23 
Farther on, he adds, by way of  summary  :
    [3]  .  .  . All  I have said about the meaning of saying that [the concept of a person] 
   is primitive is that it is not to be analysed in a certain way or ways. We are not, 
   for example, to think of it as a secondary kind of entity in relation to two primary 
   kinds,  viz, a particular consciousness and a particular human  body..  .  .24 
 These passages indicate, I think, that Strawson assumes the following  definition  :  '  Con-
cept X is logically primitive with respect to concept Y, or in other words, is logically 
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prior to concept Y, if (1) concept X cannot be derived from, be defined or explained 
by reference to, be constructed on the basis of, or otherwise be introduced into discourse 
by means of concept Y, while (2) concept Y can be introduced by means of concept 
X, and only by means of concept X. In passages [1]-[3], in which he explains what he 
means by claiming that the concept of a person is  "  logically primitive," he asserts 
several things about the connection between this concept and that of a pure subject of 
experience. In passage [1], he argues that the latter can be introduced into discourse 
only by means of the former, if it can be introduced at all, and in  [2] and [3], he asserts 
that the former cannot be built up from the latter. But in passage [2], he asserts that 
the latter can be derived from the former. What he asserts about the connection between 
these two concepts, then, is  this  : the concept of a person satisfies both condition (1) and 
condition (2) of the definition just stated for being logically primitive with respect to 
that of a pure subject. 
 One might ask why Strawson affixes the qualifying term  '  logically  ' to the terms  
'  primitive  ' and  '  prior.' In a broad sense of the term, a question can be called a matter 
of logic, I would say, if in one way or another it has to do with the meaning or function 
of a linguistic expression. But the question whether one concept (e.g., that of a  "  person ") 
is  "  primitive  " in Strawson's sense with respect to another (e.g., that of a pure subject 
of experience) has to do with the ways in which the corresponding expressions (e.g., 
 `a  person,"  a pure subject of  experience  ') are given meanings, and thus can be called 
a matter of logic. 
 Strawson's thesis of primitiveness, then, as I interpret it, can be stated as a conjunction 
of two distinct  clauses  : (1) the concept of a  "  person," in the technical sense Strawson 
gives this term, cannot be introduced into discourse by means of that of a pure subject 
of  experience  ; and (2) the concept of a pure subject of experience can be introduced 
into discourse by means of that of a  "  person," and only by means of that of a  "  person." 
It is not especially difficult to see how he argues for these two clauses. As for clause 
(1), to say that the concept of a  "  person," in Strawson's technical sense, can be introduced 
into discourse by reference to that of a pure subject of experience, is to say that it can 
be introduced by reference to that of a Cartesian ego. But if his argument against the 
Cartesian thesis is sound, then the concept of a Cartesian ego is a pseudoconcept, and 
hence cannot be used to introduce the concept of a  "  person  " into discourse. So his 
argument against the Cartesian thesis can be taken to be his argument for clause (1). 
As for the first part of clause (2), his position appears to be that the concept of a pure 
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subject of experience can be derived from that of a "person" by a process of abstraction— 
that is to say, by imagining the physical aspect of a  "  person  " to fall away, which leaves 
only the mental aspect, or to put it another way, by leaving out of account the physical 
attributes, or to put it yet another way, the physical aspect, of a  "  person." The second 
part of clause 2 is the assertion that there is no concept other than that of a subject of 
experience that has a physical aspect by means of which the concept of a subject of 
experience that has no physical aspect can be introduced into discourse. Strawson appears 
to take this to be obvious. 
 In the course of explaining his claim that the concept of a  "  person  " is  "  logically 
primitive," Strawson asserts that the concept of a disembodied person has a sound 
basis (see page 102 above, passage  [2])  . He elaborates on this at the end of his chapter 
 "  Persons  "  : 
     Earlier, when I was discussing the concept of a pure individual consciousness, I
   said that though it could not exist as a primary concept to be used in the explanation 
   of the concept of a  person  .  .  ., yet it might have a logically secondary existence. 
   Thus, from within our actual conceptual scheme, each of us can quite intelligibly 
   conceive of his or her individual survival of bodily death. The effort of imagination is 
   not even great. One has simply to think of oneself as having thoughts and memories 
   as at present, visual and auditory experiences largely as at present, even, perhaps— 
   though this involves certain complications—some quasi-tactual and organicsensations 
   as at present, whilst (a) having no perceptions of a body related to one's experience 
   as one's own body is, and (b) having no power of initiating changes in the physical 
   condition of the world, such as one at present does with one's hands, shoulders, feet 
   and vocal chords. Condition (a) must be expanded by adding that no one else 
   exhibits reactions indicating that he perceives a body at the point which one's body 
   would be occupying if one were seeing and hearing in an embodied state fromthe 
   point from which one is seeing and hearing in a disembodied  state..  .  .25 
Kim  remarks  :
     . . . As Strawsor  .  . suggests, a disembodied mind can be referred to if it had some 
   causal relations with a particular body in the  past... .26 
If I read this correctly, Kim certainly misses the point. For to speak of causal relations 
between two numerically distinct entities, a mind and a body, is to assume the truth of 
the Cartesian thesis. The position Strawson takes, which is contrary to the Cartesian 
thesis, is  this  : a subject of experience, an entity that has experiences, must be conceived, 
if it is to be conceived intelligibly, as an entity that has, or at any rate at one time had, 
physical attributes as well as experiences. The concession he makes in admitting the 
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intelligibility of the concept of a disembodied person is nothing more, and nothing less, 
than the concession represented by these words  "  or at one time had." 
5. Objections and Replies 
 In reading over Strawson's statement of his argument against the Cartesian thesis, a 
number of objections occurred to me. I have, however, attempted to render each of these 
objections void by altering my interpretation of the argument in various ways. The result 
is that I am left with no objections that I consider to be damaging. I shall now, however, 
present and discuss several objections of the sort that have occurred to me. My purpose 
is  twofold  : to forestall these particular objections, and to develop my interpretation of 
Strawson's reasoning somewhat further. 
Objection 1 
 Strawson asserts that any particular that has a spatio-temporal position has a unique 
spatio-temporal position, i.e., one shared by no other  particular." In other words, he 
asserts that if a particular occupies a certain volume of space at a certain time, then no 
other particular occupies precisely that volume at that time. This principle figures in 
his account of the grounds of the possibility of identifying particulars, and in the present 
exposition, this account in turn figures in the defense of the third premiss of his argument 
against the Cartesian thesis (see pages 97  ff. above). But the principle is false. Thus, 
for example, two clouds of gas not reactive with each other moving through space on 
intersecting paths might occupy precisely the same volume of space at a certain point 
in time. The true principle, rather, is  this  : necessarily, at any given time, any particular 
that has a position in space has a unique position there, or is distinguishable in nonspatial 
terms from the entities that share its spatial position at that time. 
  I think that this objection is sound. It does not, however, serve to undermine Strawson's 
argument. Substituting the corrected version of the principle in question for the uncor-
rected version in the argumentation that I have attributed to Strawson necessitates no 
further adjustments in that argumentation. In particular, the thesis that the general system 
of relations among particulars, the system that encompasses all particulars, is at core a 
spatio-temporal system, and the thesis that Cartesian egos can be assigned positions neither 
within this spatio-temporal core nor anywhere else in the general system, remain standing. 
Objection 2 
 As Strawson himself appears willing to allow, it is intelligible to postulate that some-
where in the universe there is a society of thinking beings whose native perceptual and 
intellectual equipment differs in fundamental ways from ours, that these beings have 
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instituted a system of relations among particulars comparable, in its adequacy to the 
needs of a sophisticated culture, to the one that we use, that this system, unlike  ours, 
is not at core a spatio-temporal one, and that it encompasses particulars of types that we 
do not recognize, including, notably, subjects of experience that do not have a corporeal 
aspect or any spatial aspect at any point in the duration of their existence. But such 
subjects are Cartesian egos, or if, besides experiences, nonspatial attributes of some sort 
pertain to them, are Cartesian egos in an extended sense of the term. Therefore, Strawson 
is mistaken to claim that the concept of a Cartesian ego cannot be given a sound basis. 
  My reply to this objection can be short. In arguing against the Cartesian thesis, 
Strawson's aim is to make several points concerning human thought and discourse. His 
claim that it is impossible to  "  frame  " or  "  get a use  for  " the concept of a Cartesian 
ego is to be understood to mean that it is impossible for us human beings to incorporate 
this concept in our own thought and discourse, i.e., impossible for us to find any way 
to make statements about or to think about particular instances of the type that this 
concept represents. 
 It should be noted, however, that under the interpretation I have presented, Strawson's 
conclusions are to be taken to apply to human thought and discourse in general, and not 
to any system of thought or weltanschauung that might be said to pertain peculiarly to 
the English language or any other particular human language or group of languages. It 
should be noted that in defending his conclusions, he does not draw upon any peculiarity 
of English or any other language. 
Objection 3 
 Strawson maintains that there is no guarantee of a logical or conceptual sort that given 
a human body that behaves in a certain way, one and only one Cartesian ego is causally 
associated with it (see pages 97  ff. above). But he merely assumes, and does not establish, 
that in the realm of contingent fact no guarantee that this is so can be found. 
 My reply is this. Through his argument against the Cartesian thesis, Strawson attempts 
to establish that the concept of a Cartesian ego is unsound in that thoughts and statements 
about individual Cartesian egos are in principle impossible. Thus, no objection to this 
argument that merely presupposes and does not establish the soundness of this concept is 
acceptable. But the suggestion that a one-to-one correspondence might through observation 
of natural phenomena be discovered to obtain between human bodies and Cartesian egos 
presupposes the soundness of the concept of a Cartesian ego, for if this concept is not 
sound, then the question whether such a correspondence might obtain simply does not 
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arise. Therefore, this objection fails in that it presupposes, and does not establish, the 
soundness of the concept of a Cartesian ego. To put the point another way, the concept 
of a Cartesian ego must somehow be incorporated in language before the question of a 
one-to-one correspondence b tween human bodies and Cartesian egos can legitimately be 
raised, but in the objection just stated, there is no indication how this might be done. 
Objection 4
 Strawson claims that the following proposition is intelligible (though e does not claim 
it is  true)  : When the body of a human being ceases to function, although the physical 
aspect of the individual in  question falls away, as it were, the mental aspect continues 
to exist as all that is left of him or her, and functions as a subject of thoughts and 
memories, perceptual experiences, etc. He calls such a subject of experience, one that 
once had but no longer has a physical aspect, a disembodied person. He appears to take 
the position that a disembodied person in this sense of the term can be identified, at 
least by itself and to itself, as  '  the pure subject of experience which at an earlier time 
was (Mr. / Ms.)  ' (see pages 104-105 above). There is, however, no guarantee that 
at the moment the body of a human being ceases to function, many pure subjects will 
not spring into being, each boasting mental attributes characteristic of and memories from 
the life of the human being whose body it was. Hence, it cannot be considered legitimate 
to employ the definite description  ' the pure subject of experience which at an earlier 
time was (Mr. / Ms.)  .' But there is no method besides the employment of this 
expression by which particular disembodied persons might be identified, and hence it 
is impossible in principle to identify them. Therefore, the concept of a disembodied 
person, defined as Strawson defines it, is in the final analysis unintelligible. 
 In reply, I grant that it is possible in principle that at the moment he body of a 
human being ceases to function, many pure subjects of experience might  "  spring into 
being," each having memories that stem from the experiences of the human being whose 
body it was. This is possible in that nothing about the relevant concepts, e.g., that of 
the body of a human being and that of a pure subject of experience, rules it out as a 
possibility. But let us suppose that following upon the death of a certain Mr. Jones, two 
disembodied persons in Strawson's technical sense, each with memories that spring from 
Jones's experiences, proceed to have qualitatively different series of experiences. One, 
for example, might perceive scenes in France, think to itself largely in Jones's halting 
French, and generally experience the optimism that was characteristic of Jones in his 
better moments, while the other might see only Idaho, think only in fluent English, and 
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generally experience the gloominess typical of Jones in times of difficulty. In a case 
of this sort, each subject might identify itself as the pure subject whose experience is 
continuous in certain respects with that of Jones and has been of such and such a sort 
since Jones's death. Now let us ask whether it is intelligible to postulate that following 
upon the death of a certain Mr. Smith, two numerically distinct pure subjects of experience 
might spring into being and proceed to have two qualitatively indistinguishable series of 
experiences which show certain continuities with Smith's experience. I think not. If the 
series of experiences in question are qualitively indistinguishable, then what is there to 
distinguish them numerically—that is to say, in virtue of what are they to be regarded as 
two series and not one  series  ? One naturally thinks of distinguishing them by reference 
to the subjects which have  them  : if one series pertains to one subject, and the other to 
a numerically distinct subject, then the two series are numerically distinct. But in virtue 
of what are the subjects in question to be regarded as two subjects and not one  subject  ?
The sum total of what can be said to identify the one subject—that since the death of 
Smith it has had experiences of this and that sort which show continuities in this and 
that respect with Smith's experience—is identical to the sum total of what can be said 
to identify the other. Hence, the subjects in question cannot be considered numerically 
 distinct  : they must be considered to be one subject. If, then, two numerically distinct 
disembodied persons represent continuations of the existence of the same human being, 
they have qualitatively different experiences. In order to save Strawson's thesis that the 
concept of a disembodied person is intelligible, then, it hs only necessary to point out that 
a disembodied person could identify itself to itself as the pure subject whose experience 
has been of such and such a description since the death of (Mr. / Ms.)  and shows 
continuity in such and such respects with his or her experience. 
Objection 5 
 Strawson's point about the logic of predicate-expressions i  unsound. For it entails that 
if one can ascribe an experience of a certain type to oneself in that one has in one's 
vocabulary a predicate-expression bearing the appropriate meaning, then one can ascribe 
experiences of that type to others also in that one knows under what conditions it is 
correct to apply that predicate-expression to them (see pages 93-94 above). But this is 
false. For, clearly, one might distinguish sensations of a novel type in one's experience, 
sensations of a type one has never had or heard mention of before, and ascribe sensations 
of that type to oneself in words like  "  I'm having that funny feeling again," and yet 
never get around to working out criteria for ascribing sensations of that type to others. 
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 This objection must, I think, be judged ineffective. Even if the possibility described 
is genuine, it does not follow that Strawson's point about the logic of predicate-expressions, 
or the first premiss of his argument against the Cartesian thesis, is unsound. For one 
need not deliberately work out criteria for the ascription of sensations of a certain type 
to others in order to be said to know under what conditions it is correct to ascribe 
sensations of that type to others. For it suffices that upon encountering a case in which 
those criteria are fulfilled, one recognize that it is correct to ascribe a sensation of the 
type in question. 
 Moreover, I think that a case can be made for saying that in a situation of the sort 
described, one would indeed have a conception of criteria for the ascription to others of 
sensations of the novel type. Suppose that a person P is in a position to ascribe sensations 
of a certain type T to himself, i.e., suppose that he possesses the intellectual resources 
requisite to saying with full comprehension and at times at which it is true,  "  I'm having 
a sensation of type T now." Then he has a more or less adequate conception of type 
T, for if he had no conception of type T, then, although he might perhaps have sensations 
of that type, in the way a dog might, he could not be said to be able to ascribe them 
at all. But if he has a more or less adequate conception of type T of sensations, then, 
clearly, he can recognize an accurate description of type T, though perhaps only with 
some difficulty, if he hears one. But this means that he is able to employ a criterion 
for the ascription of sensations of type T to others, for the following constitutes such 
a  criterion  : the uttering by another person of words that indicate the ocurrence in him 
of a sensation of that type. 
6. Summary 
  To repeat by way of summary, Strawson's argument against the Cartesian thesis reads 
as follows under my  interpretation  : If one can ascribe experiences to oneself in that one 
has the requisite predicate-expressions at one's command for use in speech and thought, 
then one can ascribe experiences to others also, in that one knows under what conditions 
it is correct to apply those predicate-expressions to others. But if one can ascribe expe-
riences to others in that one knows under what conditions it is correct to apply the 
relevant predicate-expressions to them, then one can identify others in that a coherent 
account of how to go about identifying them can be formulated. But if subjects of 
experience are Cartesian egos, then no coherent account of how to go about identifying 
others can possibly be formulated. Therefore, if subjects of experience are Cartesian 
egos, then it is impossible in principle for one to identify other subjects, and impossible 
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in principle for one to ascribe experiences to other subjects or to oneself.' This argument 
is of the form  ` if A then B, if B then C, if D then  not-C, therefore if D then (not-C and 
(not-B and not-A)),' and hence is formally valid. As for the first premiss, Strawson 
draws attention to the point, perhaps rather obvious in itself, that it is an essential 
characteristic of predicate-expressions that any given one can in principle be applied 
significantly to any number of individuals, and suggests that this principle entails this 
premiss. On page 94 above, I present a derivation of the latter from the former. As 
for the second premiss, as I state and argue for it, its defense lies in the thought 
that if no question at all arises of identifying subjects of experience that are numerically 
distinct from oneself, then there is no such thing as knowing under what conditions it 
is correct to ascribe an experience of this or that sort to another subject. See page 96 
above for a slightly fuller statement. To defend the third premiss, I have drawn upon 
materials taken from Strawson's argumentation concerning the grounds of the possibility 
of identifying particulars. The basic thought in the defense of this premiss is that 
Cartesian egos cannot be assigned positions within the general system of relations among 
particulars. See pages 97-98 above. 
 I have attempted to find an interpretation of Strawson's argument against the Cartesian 
thesis under which that argument is sound and philosophically significant. Quite apart 
from the question whether I have succeeded, I think that Strawson deserves credit for 
demonstrating as forcefully as he has, with respect to the Cartesian thesis and a number of 
other topics, the considerable philosophical importance of the matter of the identification 
of particulars. 
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